We readily recognize and live by basic moral norms, but we are less certain about where those norms come from or why they have authority. Is morality something we invent, or is it something written into the structure of the universe?
My research addresses these questions through an approach I call Relational Perfectionism. Drawing on Aristotle, Kant, and Hegel, I argue that we realize our nature as free beings not in isolation, but through our relations with others. Moral, legal, and political norms are therefore neither simply discovered in the universe nor invented by society. They emerge from the ways we develop and sustain our freedom together. This relational approach also reveals how moral, legal, and political norms form an interconnected whole.
My current book project develops this approach in metaethics and ethics. It first examines the nature of purposiveness, action, normative powers, convention, well-being, and freedom. It then applies the resulting account to central questions about rights, equality, love, and the moral status of non-human animals. Together, these investigations develop a distinctive understanding of normativity: our norms are neither timeless features of the universe nor arbitrary social inventions, but arise from the ongoing development of our nature as free beings in relation to one another.
This project builds on my previous work, including Dignity and Rights (Cambridge Elements in the Philosophy of Law, 2025). That book develops a relational account of dignity and rights that moves beyond the familiar opposition between the view that rights are grounded in pre-institutional nature and the view that they are products of social convention. My broader work has also addressed the nature of moral obligation and reasons, the relationship between value and duty, dignity and respect, human and socioeconomic rights, poverty, practical authority, and oppression.
My third book project will extend Relational Perfectionism to the philosophy of law. It develops a new account of law grounded in the nature of rights, powers, and action. On this view, law is neither an institutional overlay on an independent moral order nor merely a system of social rules and facts. It is a distinctive form of public power through which a community organizes its members' relations as free and equal beings. This account promises a new way of understanding the relationship between law, morality, and political community.
My research addresses these questions through an approach I call Relational Perfectionism. Drawing on Aristotle, Kant, and Hegel, I argue that we realize our nature as free beings not in isolation, but through our relations with others. Moral, legal, and political norms are therefore neither simply discovered in the universe nor invented by society. They emerge from the ways we develop and sustain our freedom together. This relational approach also reveals how moral, legal, and political norms form an interconnected whole.
My current book project develops this approach in metaethics and ethics. It first examines the nature of purposiveness, action, normative powers, convention, well-being, and freedom. It then applies the resulting account to central questions about rights, equality, love, and the moral status of non-human animals. Together, these investigations develop a distinctive understanding of normativity: our norms are neither timeless features of the universe nor arbitrary social inventions, but arise from the ongoing development of our nature as free beings in relation to one another.
This project builds on my previous work, including Dignity and Rights (Cambridge Elements in the Philosophy of Law, 2025). That book develops a relational account of dignity and rights that moves beyond the familiar opposition between the view that rights are grounded in pre-institutional nature and the view that they are products of social convention. My broader work has also addressed the nature of moral obligation and reasons, the relationship between value and duty, dignity and respect, human and socioeconomic rights, poverty, practical authority, and oppression.
My third book project will extend Relational Perfectionism to the philosophy of law. It develops a new account of law grounded in the nature of rights, powers, and action. On this view, law is neither an institutional overlay on an independent moral order nor merely a system of social rules and facts. It is a distinctive form of public power through which a community organizes its members' relations as free and equal beings. This account promises a new way of understanding the relationship between law, morality, and political community.
