The unifying thread of my research is the primary and irreducible significance of relationality in moral, legal, and political philosophy. By contrast, philosophers typically think that relational properties, if they matter at all, matter only derivatively. Thus, philosophers tend to analyze the varied phenomena that give texture and structure to our practical lives (your dignity, your freedom, your rights, your obligations, your equality, the significance of your sincere words, the authority of institutions, the injustice of oppression) in terms that are ultimately non-relational, such as intrapersonal norms of consistency or impersonal values to be maximized. Drawing from resources in a broadly Neo-Aristotelian metaphysics of kinds and powers, my research program seeks to turn the order of explanation upside down, showing us why the relational is basic.
Thus, in metaethics, I defend what I call 'relational primitivism', the view that relational norms like rights or directed duties are basic and irreducible and help us understand the nature of otherwise puzzling normative properties, such as the moral ought. In normative theory, I reject the standard opposition between deontology and consequentialism, proposing instead an alternative structure to ethical theory, one where deontic notions (like rights) are mutually dependent with evaluative notions (like dignity), opening up space for a powerful non-consequentialist model. In the philosophy of law, I show how drawing from a metaphysics of kinds and dispositions opens up space for a promising alternative model of dignity and rights, breaking through a familiar impasse between naturalist and conventionalist accounts. And in political philosophy, I show that the relational model can break through intractable disagreements about as diverse topics as the nature of basic equality, of practical authority, of poverty, or the injustice of oppression.
My research is historically informed, drawing primarily from the Kantian tradition. As a Kant scholar, my research proceeds in parallel to my contemporary interests -- pursuing mutual illumination. In particular, I explore the neglected intersection between Kant's broadly Neo-Aristotelian metaphysics of kinds, substances, and dispositions to illuminate the structure of Kant's practical philosophy. Kant is typically read in a non-relational way, giving priority to intrapersonal consistency or the non-relational value of humanity. By contrast, my research shows that Kant's notion of the will is embedded into a metaphysics of relational powers, that Kant's notion of the categorical imperative is a form of realism about the deontic, and that the relational structure of Kant's philosophy of right shares much more in common with his overall philosophical program than is typically appreciated. Kant is much more attuned to the interpersonal structure of our agency than is often realized.
For the next while, I plan to develop further this relational program as follows:
1. In metaethics, I engage with recent attempts to reduce normativity to some non-relational property, whether it be a value-, fittingness-, or reasons-first program, and argue that a relational program has not only been neglected in these debates, but can offer a promising alternative.
2. In normative ethics, I explore how a relational program might help us think differently about non-deontic moral phenomena, in particular the nature of love.
3. Another project engages with the intersection between the metaphysics of agency (in particular the philosophy of action) and a relational normativity, exploring whether a relational model can explain better the nature of individual and shared intentional action.
4. In legal philosophy, I'll begin to explore whether a relational model can help us to understand better the nature of criminal justice, shifting our focus to a more restorative approach.
5. Finally, my historical research will continue to examine the relational structure of Kant's account (in particular, Kant's theory of action) and explore parallels to Hegel's philosophy of right.
Thus, in metaethics, I defend what I call 'relational primitivism', the view that relational norms like rights or directed duties are basic and irreducible and help us understand the nature of otherwise puzzling normative properties, such as the moral ought. In normative theory, I reject the standard opposition between deontology and consequentialism, proposing instead an alternative structure to ethical theory, one where deontic notions (like rights) are mutually dependent with evaluative notions (like dignity), opening up space for a powerful non-consequentialist model. In the philosophy of law, I show how drawing from a metaphysics of kinds and dispositions opens up space for a promising alternative model of dignity and rights, breaking through a familiar impasse between naturalist and conventionalist accounts. And in political philosophy, I show that the relational model can break through intractable disagreements about as diverse topics as the nature of basic equality, of practical authority, of poverty, or the injustice of oppression.
My research is historically informed, drawing primarily from the Kantian tradition. As a Kant scholar, my research proceeds in parallel to my contemporary interests -- pursuing mutual illumination. In particular, I explore the neglected intersection between Kant's broadly Neo-Aristotelian metaphysics of kinds, substances, and dispositions to illuminate the structure of Kant's practical philosophy. Kant is typically read in a non-relational way, giving priority to intrapersonal consistency or the non-relational value of humanity. By contrast, my research shows that Kant's notion of the will is embedded into a metaphysics of relational powers, that Kant's notion of the categorical imperative is a form of realism about the deontic, and that the relational structure of Kant's philosophy of right shares much more in common with his overall philosophical program than is typically appreciated. Kant is much more attuned to the interpersonal structure of our agency than is often realized.
For the next while, I plan to develop further this relational program as follows:
1. In metaethics, I engage with recent attempts to reduce normativity to some non-relational property, whether it be a value-, fittingness-, or reasons-first program, and argue that a relational program has not only been neglected in these debates, but can offer a promising alternative.
2. In normative ethics, I explore how a relational program might help us think differently about non-deontic moral phenomena, in particular the nature of love.
3. Another project engages with the intersection between the metaphysics of agency (in particular the philosophy of action) and a relational normativity, exploring whether a relational model can explain better the nature of individual and shared intentional action.
4. In legal philosophy, I'll begin to explore whether a relational model can help us to understand better the nature of criminal justice, shifting our focus to a more restorative approach.
5. Finally, my historical research will continue to examine the relational structure of Kant's account (in particular, Kant's theory of action) and explore parallels to Hegel's philosophy of right.
