I am fascinated by the phenomenon of relational normativity, norms that directly relate one agent to another: status, claims, directed duties, powers. My research investigates the nature and ground of this phenomenon and explores how deep it really goes. My hunch is that it goes much deeper than philosophers have suspected, potentially revealing the relational nature of the very foundations of moral norms. This exploration takes me in the converse direction  philosophers usually take. Instead of beginning with meta-ethics and then proceeding downstream to increasingly more "applied" domains, I begin by finding the home of relational normativity in "applied" topics in ethics, such as political philosophy, philosophy of law, or normative ethics and then explore the extent to which this relational structure can shed light on more "foundational" facts, such as the nature of agency, of normativity, or of reasons for action. Similarly, as a Kant scholar, my research begins from the relational form of Kant's philosophy of right and explores the extent to which this structure is pervasive in Kant's practical philosophy.  

My dissertation defends a relational account of the ground, nature, and content of human rights as moral, legal, and political norms. 

After my dissertation, I have sought to broaden and deepen the relational account by turning to other topics in normative ethics (such as lying, moral rights, human dignity, respect) and legal and political philosophy (rights, authority). I also explored various themes in Kant's philosophy of right. 

My next major project is to turn to the connection between normative ethics, meta-ethics, and metaphysics to explore how illuminating a relational account of the foundations of morality can be. Preliminary work on this includes a relational account of the moral ought and of Kant's conception of moral obligation.