My main theoretical ambition is to develop a relational account of moral norms. By ‘relational’ I mean an account that takes as basic a directed form of normativity, that is, duties I owe you and correlative claims you have against me. By contrast, most recent moral and political philosophy has proceeded in the converse direction, seeking to ground moral norms in some non-relational concept, either an abstract rule (deontologists) or the intrinsic goodness of states of affairs brought about by compliance with rules (consequentialists). This non-relational picture of justification is so influential that, in my view, even relational-sounding theories such as Stephen Darwall’s second-personal approach or T. M. Scanlon’s contractualism succumb to it and end up having no space for directed norms at the bedrock level of justification. This is problematic because non-relational accounts miss the way in which (most) moral wrongs are not just about infringing some norm, but are essentially about wronging another. The principal advantage of a relational account, then, is that it can help us understand better the nature of moral norms and of wronging one another, such wrongs as lying, injustice, breaking a promise, murder, ingratitude, disrespect, or violating rights. By showing how moral norms have an irreducibly relational grounding in a basic directed duty of respect, a relational account brings unity and coherence to the moral domain. Moreover, a relational account transforms the way we should understand familiar moral concepts, such as personhood, freedom, dignity, rights, moral obligation, or justice, revealing them to be essentially about my normative connection to you.
A belief in the central importance of directed normative concepts (claims, rights and directed duties) has structured all my research. My recent research has focused on the directed normative concepts themselves. To take a look at this work, please visit my Publications page. My current and future research shows how a focus on directed normative concepts enables us to understand better the foundations of morality. Here is a sketch:
1. Meta-Ethics: Primitive Practical Bipolarity
My main new research project turns to questions concerning the nature of moral obligation, moral objectivity, freedom and responsibility, and practical self-consciousness. The guiding thought is that we can make progress with these familiar basic questions by taking the foundations of moral norms to be irreducibly relational. I plan to write at least four main articles: on a relational alternative to contractualism, on a relational account of moral responsibility, on a relational version of meta-ethical realism and moral objectivity, and on the internal connection between practical self-knowledge and moral claims.
In order to make this foundational inquiry more concrete, I envisage two smaller, accompanying projects, one in normative ethics, the other in political philosophy and the philosophy of law.
2. Normative Ethics: The Claim of Sincerity, on Lying and Promising.
I plan to write two articles on the claim of sincerity, one on lying, the other on promising. I will argue that we can get a more nuanced understanding of lying and promising by seeing how these phenomena are structured by a basic directed norm, namely, a claim of sincerity. Although lying and promising (typically) wrong another, the received philosophical accounts have focused on how lying and promising breach some moral norms, leaving out the crucial role played by the claims the other has on one. I will argue that these claims should be understood as grounded in a basic claim to sincerity, as an instance of relating to one another in terms of reciprocal respect.
3. Political Philosophy and Philosophy of Law: Authority
I plan to write an article on legal and political authority, growing out of my graduate seminar on this topic. Legal and political authority has appeared mysterious because it is typically understood as an instrument for bringing about non-relational values or norms. By contrast, once we set aside this instrumentalist approach, the veil of mystery lifts. Authority is warranted because it is limited by and enabling of essentially relational norms: the human rights of individuals. Seeing the internal connection between human rights and authority goes against the instrumentalist assumption and promises to show why it is that laws can give reasons to act in and of themselves.
A belief in the central importance of directed normative concepts (claims, rights and directed duties) has structured all my research. My recent research has focused on the directed normative concepts themselves. To take a look at this work, please visit my Publications page. My current and future research shows how a focus on directed normative concepts enables us to understand better the foundations of morality. Here is a sketch:
1. Meta-Ethics: Primitive Practical Bipolarity
My main new research project turns to questions concerning the nature of moral obligation, moral objectivity, freedom and responsibility, and practical self-consciousness. The guiding thought is that we can make progress with these familiar basic questions by taking the foundations of moral norms to be irreducibly relational. I plan to write at least four main articles: on a relational alternative to contractualism, on a relational account of moral responsibility, on a relational version of meta-ethical realism and moral objectivity, and on the internal connection between practical self-knowledge and moral claims.
In order to make this foundational inquiry more concrete, I envisage two smaller, accompanying projects, one in normative ethics, the other in political philosophy and the philosophy of law.
2. Normative Ethics: The Claim of Sincerity, on Lying and Promising.
I plan to write two articles on the claim of sincerity, one on lying, the other on promising. I will argue that we can get a more nuanced understanding of lying and promising by seeing how these phenomena are structured by a basic directed norm, namely, a claim of sincerity. Although lying and promising (typically) wrong another, the received philosophical accounts have focused on how lying and promising breach some moral norms, leaving out the crucial role played by the claims the other has on one. I will argue that these claims should be understood as grounded in a basic claim to sincerity, as an instance of relating to one another in terms of reciprocal respect.
3. Political Philosophy and Philosophy of Law: Authority
I plan to write an article on legal and political authority, growing out of my graduate seminar on this topic. Legal and political authority has appeared mysterious because it is typically understood as an instrument for bringing about non-relational values or norms. By contrast, once we set aside this instrumentalist approach, the veil of mystery lifts. Authority is warranted because it is limited by and enabling of essentially relational norms: the human rights of individuals. Seeing the internal connection between human rights and authority goes against the instrumentalist assumption and promises to show why it is that laws can give reasons to act in and of themselves.