Articles
'The Indivisibility of Human Rights', Law and Philosophy (forthcoming)
'Two Second-Personal Conceptions of the Dignity of Persons', European Journal of Philosophy (forthcoming)
'Human Rights, Categorical Duties: A Dilemma for Instrumentalism', Utilitas 28:4 (2016), 368-395.
'Why Human Rights? Because of You', Journal of Political Philosophy 24:3 (2016), 321-343.
'Human Rights and the Rights of States: A Relational Account, Canadian Journal of Philosophy 46:3 (2016), 291–317.
'Human Dignity', Philosophy Compass 11:4 (2016), 201–210.
'Bread as Freedom: Kant on the State's Duties to the Poor', D. Heide and E. Tiffany (eds.), Kantian Freedom (Oxford: Oxford University Press, forthcoming).
'The Public Form of Law: Kant on the Second-Personal Constitution of Freedom' Kantian Review 21:1 (2016), pp. 101-126.
'The Very Thought of (Wronging) You', J. Conant and S. Rödl, special issue on the second-person of Philosophical Topics 42:1 (2014), 153-175
'Kant’s Juridical Idea of Human Rights', A. Føllesdal and R. Maliks (eds.), Kantian Theory and Human Rights (New York: Routledge, 2014), pp. 27-51.
Book
La Educación Intercultural como Ejercicio de Derechos Humanos (Intercultural Education as Human Rights Practice), Lima: APRODEH, 2008.
Book Reviews
Review of Stephen Darwall, Honor, History, and Relationship: Essays in Second-Personal Ethics (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013) Ethics 125:3 (2015).
Work in Progress
'The Moral Structure of Human Dignity' (revise and resubmit, Australasian Journal of Philosophy)
'Moral Rights as Relational Reasons' (in progress)
'Authority and Relational Reasons' (in progress)
'The Relation of Respect: the Relational Source of Moral Normativity' (in progress)
'The Organic Unity of the State: Kant on Life, Rights, and the State' (in progress)
''An End in Itself: A Teleological Interpretation of the Categorical Imperative'' (in progress)
'The Claim of Sincerity I: A Relational Account of Lying' (in progress)
'The Indivisibility of Human Rights', Law and Philosophy (forthcoming)
- This article defends a novel, normative conception of the indivisibility of human rights. Human rights are indivisible because normative commitment to one mutually entails normative commitment to another. The normative conception enables us to defend three important theoretical and practical corollaries. First, as a conceptual thesis normative indivisibility lets us see how human rights constitute a unified system not liable to the typical counter-examples to indivisibility as mutual indispensability. Second, as a dialectical thesis, normative indivisibility can support linkage arguments in defense of controversial human rights. And third, as a political thesis, normative indivisibility can show why the political thesis of indivisibility means that states lack discretion to ‘pick and choose’ which human rights to implement.
'Two Second-Personal Conceptions of the Dignity of Persons', European Journal of Philosophy (forthcoming)
- This article considers Stephen Darwall’s influential conception of ‘second-personal reasons' and its related second-personal conception of the dignity of persons. On Darwall's account, this dignity consists in the authority of individuals over one another in the form of demands. I argue that this position faces an internal incoherence and propose an account that takes an irreducibly relational form, and so is second-personal in a different way. The proposed relational account captures the virtues of Darwall's version of the second-person while avoiding its incoherence. By clearly distinguishing two second-personal conceptions of the dignity of persons, the article promises to enrich further the burgeoning philosophical literature on the nature of the dignity of persons.
'Human Rights, Categorical Duties: A Dilemma for Instrumentalism', Utilitas 28:4 (2016), 368-395.
- This article questions the prevalent assumption that an instrumentalist account can accommodate the categorical duties typically thought to correlate with human rights. As a result, it formulates a dilemma: we should either give up instrumentalism about human rights, or we should develop a deflationary account of human rights, where such rights do not generate categorical duties. I suggest that the latter horn comes at the high cost of potentially rendering human rights unintelligible.
'Why Human Rights? Because of You', Journal of Political Philosophy 24:3 (2016), 321-343.
- This article defends a relational deontological justification of human rights and shows that such a model of justification avoids the problems of vicious circularity and emptiness typically attributed to deontological accounts.
'Human Rights and the Rights of States: A Relational Account, Canadian Journal of Philosophy 46:3 (2016), 291–317.
- This article defends a relational deontological justification of the rights of states and offers an alternative to the currently dominant cosmopolitan thesis that the justification of the sovereignty of states is instrumental. Instead, I argue that the sovereignty of states is justified non-instrumentally as partly constitutive of the human rights of individuals.
'Human Dignity', Philosophy Compass 11:4 (2016), 201–210.
- This article offers a critical survey of leading philosophical accounts of human dignity.
'Bread as Freedom: Kant on the State's Duties to the Poor', D. Heide and E. Tiffany (eds.), Kantian Freedom (Oxford: Oxford University Press, forthcoming).
- This article offers a novel interpretation of Kant's puzzling claim that the state owes duties of support to the poor. Such duties are neither duties of charity nor private duties remedying the asymmetries of a property system. Rather, they are public duties generated by the view that our agency is essentially animal.
'The Public Form of Law: Kant on the Second-Personal Constitution of Freedom' Kantian Review 21:1 (2016), pp. 101-126.
- This article articulates and defend a novel, second-personal interpretation of Immanuel Kant's conception of the relationship between external freedom and public law.
'The Very Thought of (Wronging) You', J. Conant and S. Rödl, special issue on the second-person of Philosophical Topics 42:1 (2014), 153-175
- This article articulates and defend a second-personal theory of rights, the view that claim-rights are fundamentally first-order claims to independence from others coupled with a second-order power of enforcement. This view seeks to offer an alternative to the two standard theories of rights, namely, the Interest and the Choice theories.
'Kant’s Juridical Idea of Human Rights', A. Føllesdal and R. Maliks (eds.), Kantian Theory and Human Rights (New York: Routledge, 2014), pp. 27-51.
- This article defends the view that Kant's legal and political philosophy offers the resources for articulating a promising and distinctive account of human rights as necessary specifications of the innate right to freedom.
Book
La Educación Intercultural como Ejercicio de Derechos Humanos (Intercultural Education as Human Rights Practice), Lima: APRODEH, 2008.
- In this short, popular book designed as a teaching tool in Peru, I argue that respect for human rights requires instituting an intercultural model of education. To do so, first I sketch a model theory of human rights as direct requirements of respect for another's freedom and then show how this conception of human rights means that in multicultural contexts the system of education must be intercultural. I conclude by suggesting some guidelines about how this model of education might be implemented.
Book Reviews
Review of Stephen Darwall, Honor, History, and Relationship: Essays in Second-Personal Ethics (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013) Ethics 125:3 (2015).
Work in Progress
'The Moral Structure of Human Dignity' (revise and resubmit, Australasian Journal of Philosophy)
'Moral Rights as Relational Reasons' (in progress)
'Authority and Relational Reasons' (in progress)
'The Relation of Respect: the Relational Source of Moral Normativity' (in progress)
'The Organic Unity of the State: Kant on Life, Rights, and the State' (in progress)
''An End in Itself: A Teleological Interpretation of the Categorical Imperative'' (in progress)
'The Claim of Sincerity I: A Relational Account of Lying' (in progress)
